I've written before that, despite all of our hopes, it should be considered unlikely that the student protests and calls for reform will have much effect on governance in Iran - at least in the short term. The movement (for lack of a better word) lacks a center: it has no leader(s), no money, no arms, no infrastructure or organization. The movement is more reaction than action; it lacks resources and direction and is, thus, no match for the well-organized and entrenched Guardian Council, which consolidated its power in the election last week. With the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran appears to have formally thumbed its nose at the West and to have rejected internal calls for reform. There will likely be no rapprochement with the U.S., nor is it likely that Iran will abandon its nuclear ambitions. In fact, Iran's Guardian Council rejected a large number of qualified, but moderate, candidates to ensure that reforms proceed slowly - if at all. Iranians know that reform is not imminent, they know that a moderate candidate has no chance of wresting power from the Council, which is why so few even bothered to vote.
In the long run, however, demographics, the changing political face of the Middle East, increasing world pressure, a desire for economic liberalization and development, and the frustration of Iran's youth are likely to have a democratizing effect. A more repressive and draconian Guardian Council will likely count short-term successes, but, over the long haul, succeed only in fomenting the type of frustration they had hoped to avoid. The Council is notoriously obstinate, and it's that obstinacy that just may provide enough fuel to the student movement and to provide the will needed to create an infrastructure and sustain an organization. The Council, along with President Ahmadinejad, would be wise to keep moving - even slowly - toward reforms. Otherwise they risk setting a spark to the smoldering movement. And fires, once lit, usually grow and are impossible to predict.
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